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Abstract 
‘You can’t stop progress’, we are endlessly told. But what is meant by “progress”? 
What is “progress” toward? We are rarely told. Human flourishing? And a culture? 
That would be a good start – but rarely seems a criterion for ‘progress’. (In fact, sur- 
vival would be a good start…) 
Rather, ‘progress’ is simply a process, that we are not allowed, apparently, to stop. 
Or rather: it would be futile to seek to stop it. So that we are seemingly-deliberately 
demoralised into giving up even trying. 
Questioning the myth of ‘progress’, and seeking to substitute for it the idea of real 
progress – progress which is actually assessed according to some independent not- 
purely-procedural criteria – is a vital thing to do, at this point in history. Literally: 
life, or at least civilisation, and thus culture, may depend on it. 
Once we overcome the myth of ‘progress’, we can clear the ground for a real politics 
that would jettison the absurd hubris of liberalism and of most ‘Leftism’. And would 
jettison the extreme Prometheanism and lack of precaution endemic to our current 
pseudo-democratic technocracy. The challenge is to do so in a way that does not 
fall into complete pessimism or into an endorsement of the untenable and unsavoury 
features of conservatism. The challenge, in other words, is to generate an ideology or 
philosophy for our time, that might yet save us, and ensure that we are worth saving. 
This paper is then a kind of reading of Wittgenstein’s crucial aphorism on this 
topic: ‘Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form 
rather than making progress being one of its features.’ 
 
Our civilization is characterized by the word ‘progress’. Progress 
is its form rather than making progress one of its features. 
Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever 
more complicated structure.1 
 
 
1 The quote continues: ‘And even clarity is only sought as a means to 
this end, not as an end in itself. For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity 
are valuable in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so 
much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of typical build- 
ings.’ Culture and Value (ed. G. H. von Wright; transl. Peter Winch; 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 7–8. 
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This piece is a reading of what I think is Wittgenstein’s greatest aph- 
orism on the topic of progress: ‘Our Civilisation is characterised by 
the word “progress”. Progress is its form rather than making progress 
being one of its features.’ Somebody reading that aphorism superfi- 
cially might think that what Wittgenstein is saying is that progress 
is a feature of our civilisation and isn’t that just great? But that’s 
exactly what he’s not saying – it’s the opposite of what he is saying 
– and I will aspire to bring that out. 
Wittgenstein was very sceptical, as we shall see, about the idea of 
progress. And he thought that the way in which this aphorism was 
true reflected very badly on our civilisation. 
In order to start seeing how and why, I want to turn straight away to 
another quote from Wittgenstein (in fact, from Nestroy), the epi- 
graph for Philosophical Investigations:2 ‘It is in the nature of progress 
that it is always less than it seems’. What is Wittgenstein telling us by 
putting this at the front of his great later work, the Philosophical 
Investigations? 
Well, the standard professed reading of this aphorism, in so far as 
there is one – people don’t often pay it a lot of attention, which is in- 
teresting and telling in itself – is that what Wittgenstein is saying here 
is that the progress between his own early work and later work is 
much less than it seems. And I am in favour of that interpretation 
of this aphorism. 
But, on most readings of Wittgenstein, it is impossible to under- 
stand how to take that interpretation seriously. Most readings 
of Wittgenstein, at least until recently, have suggested that 
Wittgenstein had ‘two distinct philosophies’, and that the later was 
a massive advance on the former, which had been refuted. 
I would like to go so far as to say that, in recent years, I think we 
have started taking seriously this remark of Nestroy’s as the epigraph 
to the Investigations for the first time. And this has been part of the so- 
called ‘New Wittgenstein’ interpretation that I and others have devel- 
oped,3 which suggests that it’s a radical misunderstanding of 
Wittgenstein to think that in his early work he proposed a theory, 
and then in his later work he said, ‘No, that theory is wrong’, and pro- 
posed another theory, or even the-absence-of-a-theory as a new idol.4 
 
2     Philosophical Investigations (London: MacMillan, 2009/1953). 
3 See my and Crary’s edited collection, The New Wittgenstein (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
4 On this last point, see Martin Stone’s essay in my and Crary’s (ibid)., 
‘Wittgenstein on deconstruction’, and my own ‘A no-theory theory?’, 
Philosophical Investigations 29:1 (2006), 73–81. 
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He didn’t propose any theory in his early work; his early work was 
already dedicated to the complete overthrow of philosophical theor- 
ies. And the progress between his early work and later work, in my 
view, is basically a (deep) question of style and presentation and 
depth and detail.5 And enriching, as he put it famously, our diet of 
examples, in a way that was not present in his early work, the 
Tractatus, where his diet of examples was very very thin. He was 
undernourished with examples in his early work, and that’s one of 
the key changes between the early work and the later work, according 
to our ‘New Wittgenstein’ interpretation, which is also sometimes 
called the ‘Resolute Reading’ of Wittgenstein. 
The idea is that Wittgenstein, throughout his life, was resolutely 
opposed to philosophical theorising, and resolutely determined to 
overcome the philosophical theories that he saw gripping contempor- 
aries and antecedents, without replacing them with anything of the 
same form, or even with anything of the same form as the ‘gap’ 
which their passing seemed to leave. 
So I believe that (t)his epigraph is intended by Wittgenstein as a 
way of introducing the Philosophical Investigations and saying, in 
effect, in advance prophylactical warning, ‘Don’t make the mistake 
of thinking that the progress I’ve made here on my earlier work is 
very great’. 
But I also want to put it to you that this epigraph is doing a lot more 
than that. I think it would be a mistake, a serious mistake, to see this 
epigraph as narrowly self-regarding on Wittgenstein’s part. It’s not 
just about his own work. 
The transition from the Tractatus, his earlier work, to the 
Philosophical Investigations, his later work, and his thought that, 
‘You should try to see this as a case where actually, there is very 
little progress, much less has changed than might meet the eye’, is in- 
tended by him, I believe, as an example. It’s an example of a much 
broader phenomenon. It’s an example of, if you like, the way in 
which we tend, drastically, and dangerously, and in a dubiously 
self-congratulatorily mode, to overestimate the progress that we 
have made as individuals, as a discipline, as a society, and as a 
civilisation. 
Wittgenstein wanted to suggest, with regard to authors who are 
tempted say, ‘In my early work I thought this and then I realised it 
was wrong and now I’ve got these brilliant new ideas to replace 
 
5 For detail, see my and Rob Deans’s ‘The possibility of a resolutely 
resolute reading of the Tractatus’, in my and Matt Lavery’s Beyond the 
Tractatus Wars (London: Routledge,  2011). 
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those old rubbish ideas with’, that there is something dangerous 
about that attitude on their part.6 
And in the same kind of way, he thinks that when we as a society 
say, ‘In the old days we were primitive, and now we’re modern and 
we’ve got all these brilliant ways of organising everything that 
shows so clearly how we’ve progressed, from the dark depths of our 
ancestors, from the ‘Dark Ages’’, that we are engaging in self-back- 
patting behaviour of a dubious kind. (It’s funny how people virtually 
never say, ‘We’re living in a dark age’. The ‘Dark Ages’ are almost 
always sometime long ago.) 
Wittgenstein intends this epigraph (to Philosophical Investigations) 
to bring to our attention his own small progress, as an example of a 
much broader phenomenon of the way we’re inclined to overestimate 
the nature of progress, and about how this is dangerous. About how 
the idea of progress – the tacit ideology, as I shall put it to you that it is, 
of progress – is, as he famously puts it elsewhere, a picture that holds 
us captive. He wants to help release us from this captivity. He wants to 
suggest that we need to be much more judicious in measuring or 
assuming or claiming progress. 
Before I consider progress as a general unthinking societal ideol- 
ogy, and as a phenomenon that Wittgenstein thinks is less real than 
it seems, I want to dwell just a moment more on Wittgenstein on pro- 
gress in philosophy. So here’s a third quotation from Wittgenstein: 
‘Philosophy hasn’t made any progress? – If somebody scratches the 
spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn’t 
genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching itching? And can’t 
this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long 
time before a cure for the itching is discovered?’7 
I think this is a wonderful way of – as Wittgenstein not-infrequent- 
ly does – demystifying or puncturing the nimbus of grandiosity that 
we sometimes build around philosophy. He likens philosophy, the 
history of philosophy, to scratching an inch. This is quite a 
radical – disruptive – move to be making. 
Most of the history of philosophy consists in scratching an itch. 
And of course scratching an itch can make it worse; it doesn’t neces- 
sarily create progress at all. It can also, when at works, be at least 
 
6 My own view is that Wittgenstein himself did not succeed in fully over- 
coming this tendency in himself. See my essay in Beyond the Tractatus wars 
(ibid.), for explication. (In other words: I think that Wittgenstein in his later 
work became if anything slightly too hard on his early work.) But at least he 
drew our attention powerfully to the tendency. 
7    Culture and Value, 86. 
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temporarily satisfying. Well, that might be figured as a kind of pro- 
gress. But, as he says, ‘Do we have to see some progress?’ Real pro- 
gress in philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is in another register entirely; 
it doesn’t consist in what we are inclined to think of as progress. 
Real progress is discovering a cure: no longer needing to scratch the 
itch. Or simply no longer itching. And those are what Wittgenstein 
did, or (at least) that’s what he thought he did, and I agree with him. 
It’s also – and this is very important – not just what he did in his 
later work and earlier work; it’s also what many of his great predeces- 
sors  had  done.  People  such  as  Descartes,  Berkeley,   Hume, 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Frege. 
It’s a mistake to think that what Wittgenstein thinks about these 
figures that came before him is that they’re all almost idiots, or all 
to be simply jettisoned. He didn’t think that at all. He thought 
these people were great deep thinkers, wrestling with great deep pro- 
blematics. And he thought that at their best, unlike many of their in- 
terpreters and followers, they did actually succeed in offering clues 
towards a cure of the desire to philosophise. 
I think it’s clear how one can see this at moments in the work of 
people such as Nietzsche and Frege – I’ll come back to them, 
shortly. Gordon Baker, one of my teachers, famously argued this in 
reinterpreting Descartes, alongside Katherine Morris.8 Cora 
Diamond, another of my teachers, has argued the same for 
Berkeley.9 I’ve argued the same for Hume.10 James Conant has 
argued the same for Kierkegaard.11 We ‘New Wittgensteinians’, 
one of the things we like to do is to go back into the history of phil- 
osophy and say, ‘From a Wittgensteinian point of view, these 
people were not idiots; it’s not that they were just down there primi- 
tively in the dirt and we’ve made this huge progress now’. No. 
Very roughly: They were already seeking to do the very thing that 
Wittgenstein succeeded just a little bit better in doing. And it’s not like 
he’s completed the job either. People sometimes think, ‘Didn’t 
Wittgenstein end philosophy? Or thought he’d ended philosophy?’ 
 
8 Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris, Descartes’s dualism (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
9 In the title essay of The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 
1991). 
10   See my ‘The new antagonists of “the New Hume”: on the relevance 
of Wittgenstein and Goodman to the “New Hume debate”’, in my and Ken 
Richman’s The New Hume Debate (London: Routledge, 2007). 
11 See e.g. his masterly ‘Must We Show What We Cannot Say?’ in The 
Senses of Stanley Cavell, ed. R. Fleming and M. Payne (Bucknell University 
Press, Lewisburg: 1989), 242–283. 
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No, he didn’t think that and there are numerous places in his texts 
where you can see that he didn’t think that.12 What he thought was 
that, when you were in philosophy seriously, you must be seeking 
in some sense to end the process or pain of itching. But he didn’t com- 
placently or hubristically assume that he had arrived at that place 
where he no longer had any itches, nor that doing so could be 
achieved by any kind of frontal assault, any broadly ‘linear’ or ‘pro- 
gressive’ method. 
So, a crucial point: looking back on the history of philosophy, what 
we see when we look at the great philosophers at their greatest 
moments is something broadly similar. Look at Frege, for example, 
at his deepest, when he says things like ‘The reader needs at this 
point in my work to give me a pinch of salt, there is something 
here that I want to say but I can’t quite succeed in saying it’;13 or, 
at Nietzsche when he gets to the moment close to the end of the 
Genealogy of Morality (and in book five of The Gay Science) when 
he, as I see it, successfully shows us, in relation to the very people 
who he is criticising, Christian thinkers etcetera, that he is, in a 
way, an extreme example of that very same mode of thinking.14 
He’s trying to bring something to an end but it’s very difficult to 
do so. This kind of ‘real progress’, this kind of cure, as opposed to 
just scratching an itch, is not achievable by aping science. 
Nietzsche is telling us that he has achieved far less progress than 
meets the eye over asceticism. Frege is telling us that he his new 
way of doing philosophy (that launched ‘analytic philosophy’) is far 
less securely founded than meets the eye, and that it is not (as most 
of his ‘successors’ have taken it to be) a new invulnerable quasi-scien- 
tific enterprise. This is great: for a philosopher to acknowledge their 
own limits, to push up-front their not having made a progressive 
bound, but having rather made a painful small and not-of-the- 
kind-as-usually-understood shuffle forward beyond the greatness of 
what came before. For us to understand how Nietzsche has improved 
on what has gone before, we have to see the profound level of the com- 
monality he has with his supposed enemies. For us to understand 
how Frege has improved on what has gone before, likewise. 
 
12 See e.g. Zettel (Berkeley: U. Cal. Press / Blackwell, 1967) section 447. 
See also my reading of 133, a passage often (wrongly) adduced to impute an 
‘end of philosophy’ philosophy to Wittgenstein: ‘The real philosophical dis- 
covery’, Philosophical Investigations 18:4 (1995), 362–369. 
13 See my reading thereof in Chapter 1 of my A Wittgensteinian Way 
with Paradoxes (New York: Lexington, 2013). 
14   I offer this reading in Chapter 10 of my (ibid). 
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Science: the quintessentially progressive subject, or set of subjects. 
This is what a lot of my work in recent years has been about: How 
various subjects such as, most strikingly, the ‘social sciences’, but 
also philosophy itself, are subjects that do not progress as science 
undoubtedly does. Science progresses, most strikingly, for example, 
in the way that, as Thomas Kuhn famously describes to us: there is 
the process of ‘normal science’. In which, what science consists of 
is essentially puzzle-solving, working away at a set of problems 
which are widely accepted, filling out a paradigm, filling out a 
theory which is already present and making it better, making it 
more accurate, filling in the holes in it. That’s progress. That is a 
way in which it makes good sense to talk about progress. 
But just because science has been successful does not imply that 
other subjects can or (even ‘ideally’) should progress in the same 
way. And in particular, a great deal of the history of philosophy, espe- 
cially in recent years, has been occupied by people thinking, ‘Hell if 
only we could make our subject into a subject like science and pro- 
gress like science does, wouldn’t that be great?’ And the answer is: 
no; it’s a farrago, it’s a disaster. This is one of the key things that 
Wittgenstein sought to show us. Philosophers have tried to progress 
typically by answering questions, metaphysical questions, epistemo- 
logical questions, logical questions. Answering questions is the right 
thing to do when it’s clear that there are questions to ask, and that the 
questions have been framed aright. Just what isn’t ever clear, in 
philosophy. 
This – scientism, the idea that every discipline should proceed and 
progress by answering questions, solving puzzles – isn’t the way 
Wittgenstein taught us to make any real progress in philosophy. On 
the very contrary: one needs rather to interrogate the questions, to 
question the questions. And to interrogate the tacit ideologies that 
generate these questions in our mind. For example, the ideology of 
scientism itself, the ideology that says that: every real problem 
should be answered by the methodology of science. Scientism is a jus- 
tification, a would-be justification, for technophilia, for the dogmatic 
love of technology, and for the ideology of progressivism that I am 
going to talk more about in a moment. 
Actually, the justification doesn’t work even if scientism were right 
(which it isn’t), because it doesn’t follow from the fact that there is 
scientific progress, that there is in the same sense technological pro- 
gress. Scientific progress is about us coming to know more about 
the world; technological progress is about us being able to do more 
to the world. But just because we can do more to the world, it 
doesn’t necessarily mean that we ought to do more to the world. 
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Barring certain extreme cases where questions of ethics arise, no-one 
can really complain – there is nothing to be said against it – when 
scientists learn something they didn’t know before; but when a new 
technology is created it’s always an open question whether we 
should complain. I am going to suggest that sometimes we should 
and that sometimes it is essential, indeed, for us to do so. 
In this way, and this is a central idea of my lecture, we need an inde- 
pendent criterion to assess technological progress by means of. Just 
because a new technological innovation has occurred, it does not 
mean that we should really describe that as progress. 
So, as I say, in the Twentieth and Twenty-first century in particu- 
lar, philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world, has tended 
to embrace one form or another of scientism unfortunately. 
Wittgenstein has mounted a heroic rear-guard action against scien- 
tism, as manifested especially in so-called analytic philosophy, a ‘dis- 
cipline’ in which we make progress; we make progress allegedly on the 
mind-body problem, on the problem of our knowledge of the so- 
called external world; and so on and so forth. 
Let me attempt an adaptation of the aphorism with which I began, 
applying it now specifically to our subject of philosophy. I put it to 
you that Wittgenstein could have said about that specific topic, 
‘Our discipline is characterised by the word progress; progress is its 
form, rather than making progress being one of its features.’ And in 
saying that, he would have been mounting the most powerful criticism 
of our discipline, philosophy, as it views itself. For that is an incoher- 
ent way of understanding what philosophy is, but it is the dominant 
understanding of what philosophy is in a country like this, or in the 
United States, today. 
So as I say, and as I said earlier, think about what Wittgenstein is 
saying about progress as being about his own philosophy, and about 
philosophy in general, but about these things as an example of a much 
broader phenomenon, a phenomenon that effects our entire civilisa- 
tion. When people say things like, ‘You can’t stop progress’ they have 
in mind exactly a version of progress that Wittgenstein is criticising, 
when he says that ‘our civilisation is characterised by the word pro- 
gress; progress is its form, rather than making progress being one 
of its features.’ 
Such people are implying there is no need for, there is no room for, an 
independent criterion by means of which we can assess the degree, or 
otherwise, to which there has been progress. Progress is what our 
society does by definition. (What the engines of technological and eco- 
nomic change do. The accumulation of information, knowledge, 
power.) And I want to counterpoise against that the idea of real progress. 
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But before I tell you more about what real progress would mean, let 
me dwell a little bit more on the way that the term ‘progress’ generally 
functions when people say things like ‘We can’t stop progress’, and 
what is wrong with this. Progress in this sense is, among other 
things, crucially, I put it to you, synonymous with ‘growth’; or, 
more specifically, economic growth (growth in ‘GDP’). And with 
technological expansionism, and with the concept of ‘development’, 
as in, ‘sustainable development’; as in, the idea that when we have a 
load of new houses being built, on a flood plain, or in a green belt, 
that’s development – after all, that’s simply what it’s called. 
There is a new ‘development’ going up around Cambridge, say. Is 
that really a development? You can’t ask that question. Because devel- 
opment, by definition, is what ‘development’ is. ‘It is progress’; that 
is what we’re told without it even being needed to be made explicit. 
The idea is that these things are somehow inevitable and that 
destiny says that we are moving ever onward and upward, that there 
is no end to this process. Again, this is what Wittgenstein is criticising 
in the aphorism which this lecture is focussed around reading. And I 
want to say that he is right. 
Other voices who are pointing in the same direction as me at the 
present time in this country include the interesting, quasi-conserva- 
tive, philosopher, John Gray, who is I think right to challenge the 
myth of progress, which he has done explicitly. I will return to 
Gray below. Mayer Hillman, Emeritus Fellow of the Policy Studies 
Institute, is another, arguing, at the present time, that the likelihood 
now is that our children and our grandchildren will inherit worsening 
conditions of life relative to ourselves, which is not something that 
we’re used to. This is a new phenomenon; it doesn’t fit the ideology 
that we’ve been brought up with. 
Almost certainly, by the way, this point of worsening has already 
begun. It’s very hard to measure these things – there’s a philosophical 
question about the extent to which measurement as such is a worth- 
while aspiration, when it comes to happiness, etc. . But, in so far as 
these things can be measured, it looks as if there is some evidence 
to believe that things have got worse in countries like this and the 
United States and much of Europe. Since about the 1950s, and cer- 
tainly since the 1970s, it appears that things have gradually started 
getting worse.15 ‘In spite of’ the economy continuing to grow, and 
new technologies continuing to become available. 
 
 
15 See e.g. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/happiness_ 
formula/4771908.stm. 
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We have, I believe, to junk the idea of progress as inevitable. Any 
hard won real progress has to be real. We need an independent criter- 
ion to measure it by. 
Because technological progress is not an independent criterion. 
Technological progress is simply what occurs ‘naturally’, if scientists 
and engineers and investors and so on are allowed and facilitated to act 
as they tend to, in a society like ours. Technological progress is simply 
what our society does. This is what Wittgenstein is saying. But that by 
no means implies that such progress is always to be welcomed. 
What about Gross Domestic Progress? Does an increase in GDP – 
‘economic growth’ – connote a measure of (real) progress? Can it be 
an independent criterion by which to measure our society? Of 
course not, for the reasons I’ve given: An increase in GDP is 
simply what our economy is expected to do ‘naturally’. It doesn’t 
actually mean that things really are getting better: for lots of things 
increase GDP while actually making things worse. A classic 
example, so incredible that it serves in itself as a kind of reductio ad 
absurdum of economic-growthism, is the apparent fact that the 
judgement of expert economists is that the most-harmful-ever oil 
spill, the BP Gulf of Mexico disaster of 2010, was actually ‘beneficial’ 
to the economy, increasing GDP…16 
So: What might such an independent criterion actually be? Well, as 
implied above, perhaps something like well-being. Do people actual- 
ly have a stronger sense of well-being than they did before? One might 
generalise and talk about the flourishing of all beings, including non- 
human beings. Are we the only species that matters? And indeed 
future people, our descendants: they matter, too.17 I believe that a 
return to one-planet living, to living as if we have one planet – at 
the moment we’re living in this country as if we have about 4; so 
that’s about 3 more than area actually available – is not only non- 
negotiable; I believe that such a return to one-planet living must be 
part of the independent criterion I am referring to, by means of 
which we assess whether we are actually making progress. Because I 
don’t see how we can be making progress, if we are overshooting 
the limits to growth and eating into the life-support-conditions of 
our children. 
I want to put it to you that real progress probably requires the 
opposite of most of what is currently called progress. It probably 
 
16 See e.g. section 6 of http://useconomy.about.com/od/suppl1/tp/ 
BP_Oil_Spill.htm. 
17 See on this my ‘On Future People’, in Think 10:29, 43–47: http:// 
journals.cambridge.org/repo_A83AqV93. 
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requires, for example, an end to ‘economic growth’. At this point 
people often say, ‘But then, what are you going to do about all the 
people living in poverty?’ 
In order to solve poverty in a world where we are awash in riches 
and wealth, which most of us are experiencing in this country at a 
level of all-time historical decadence, where there are people who 
are poor, surely the answer is that the rich need to give up a bit of 
what they have and share it with them. Once that’s done the need 
for growth is (to say the least) by no means clear any longer. 
Sometimes, people recently say things to me in objection along the 
following lines: ‘Ah yes, but haven’t you read Thomas Piketty? The 
great Thomas Piketty has told us that the world is dreadfully unequal 
and becoming more unequal’. Piketty’s dead right about that. But 
Piketty has also suggested that a key part of the problem is that we 
don’t have as much economic growth as we used to. And my response 
to Professor Piketty at that point is to say, ‘If you’re really wanting to 
inherit the mantel of Karl Marx, wouldn’t it behove you to talk rather 
less about growth and rather more about sharing?’18 
Progress, growth: these are obstacles to our thinking. They 
imprison us. We need freedom from them. We need what Wittgen- 
stein called ‘liberation’ from them, unless we radically reconceive 
what they are. We have, in particular, to give up the idea that these 
things are linear, or that they are endless, or that they are intrinsically 
desirable. Now there is a certain sense in which there is a linearity to 
progress; there is a wonderful fact about human beings, which is not 
true of most other animals – I say ‘most’ because it is now clear that 
there are modicums of what we call culture present in the lives of 
some of our primate cousins, including chimpanzees, bonobos and 
some monkeys, and in many cetaceans. The wonderful fact is that 
we as human beings, to a much greater extent than they, are historical 
beings. This is a marvellous thing, that we can learn and in some ways 
we always do learn from our mistakes in history, from what happened 
before. Often of course, not as much as we should (or nothing at all; or 
less than nothing!). I.e. this process is not guaranteed. 
Think of the Middle Ages where it appears that, while we learned 
some things, we also lost quite a lot of knowledge. There was a 
gradual loss of knowledge, texts gradually deteriorated as they were 
copied etcetera etcetera… We can lose knowledge. And of course it 
 
 
18 My full response to Piketty can be found here, in Radical Philosophy 
189: ‘Green economics versus growth economics’, https://www.radicalphi- 
losophy.com/commentary/green-economics-versus-growth-economics. 
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can go much further than that; societies can collapse.19 And in fact 
what we find if we look at societies that have collapsed, is that most 
often they’ve collapsed if they’ve sought to progress endlessly… 
If we turn to the term ‘growth’, then of course one thing which is 
important to notice is that the term growth is a term that is taken from 
a biological original meaning. Growth in biology is something 
organic. It involves circular rhythms: something grows, it matures, 
it decays, it dies, it decays completely, it becomes raw material for 
something else to grow. When we think of it in that way, as a lifecycle, 
one question one might ask is, ‘Does that mean that economies are 
doomed to collapse?’ I don’t think they’re doomed to collapse, I 
don’t think we’re doomed to collapse. But we have to think beyond 
the box of endless growth if we’re going to escape that doom. And 
that economies are (hopefully) not doomed to collapse is itself an 
indicator of the serious limits and hazards of the ‘growth’ metaphor… 
And we should note furthermore that that the very idea of economic 
growth is a kind of bastardisation, a dangerous projection of biology 
onto the inorganic. Because it fantasises the economy as an organism, 
while trying to extricate from the idea of being an organism the idea of 
it achieving any kind of maturity and being subject to any kinds of 
limits. The ideology of endless growth is a profoundly anti-biological 
ideology, and this is a profound problem. 
Now in the past, when societies have collapsed the people who sur- 
vived those collapses, if any, have learnt from those collapses; they’ve 
learned how to be more ‘sustainable’, as the current jargon has it.20 
Tim Flannery, explains this process wonderfully in his book The 
Future Eaters.21 He explains how we can resolve the paradox that, 
on the one hand we want to say indigenous peoples are these wonder- 
ful paragons of ecological virtue, and on the other hand, indigenous 
peoples destroyed all their mega-fauna. Both are true. 
Basically the process, as Flannery describes it, is that typically 
what’s happened in our deep pre-history is that indigenous peoples, 
our deep ancestors, have destroyed many of the conditions for their 
own lives. And have then learned from that destruction and have 
 
 
19 See on this Jared Diamond’s important book, Collapse (London: 
Penguin, 2011). 
20 For my objections to that jargon, see the section on 
‘“Sustainability”?’ in my chapter on ‘Post-growth common-sense’ in John 
Blewitt and Ray Cunningham’s The Post-Growth Project (London: 
London Publishing Partnership, 2014). 
21 The Future Eaters (Kew: Reed Books, 1994). 
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learned ecological wisdom that we then sometimes found them with 
when we encountered them. 
The problem of course is that we can’t afford to learn from our own 
collapse, because if our own collapse occurs, it will be global and 
probably completely terminal. We must instead take a fundamentally 
precautionary attitude, we must learn from the mistakes of others 
before committing mistakes of the same gravity. This requires a 
giving up of the delusions of ‘endless progress’, ‘growth’, ‘develop- 
ment’ before it’s too late. We must learn from their collapses and eco- 
logical disasters, not our own. 
And this brings us to what is the terrible irony of the ideology of 
progressivism (and similar ideologies such as modernism): it is thor- 
oughly out of date. It might have been an appropriate ideology in the 
eighteenth century or the nineteenth century – that is something we 
can debate – but it is not, now. The one fundamental way in which 
modernists are not modern is in regard to the relevance now of 
their own ideology! One fundamental way in which progressivists 
are not entitled to the term ‘progressive’ at all is that they don’t under- 
stand how real progress now would mean precisely giving up the 
delusion of progressivism… It is paradoxical but true: progressivism 
is a defunct, out-of-date ideology. The idea that we must always be 
more modern is itself thoroughly past its sell-by-date. 
This brings us to the vexed and vexing question of Wittgenstein 
and his relation to conservatism. There is a famous essay by J.C. 
Nyiri, ‘Wittgenstein’s later work in relation to Conservatism’;22 it 
caused an academic storm many years ago now. Because many 
people, and I think rightly, were concerned at the implication in 
the essay, that the implication of thinking through Wittgenstein’s 
thinking, in something like the way I’ve done, led one to some 
very pessimistic and problematically politically-conservative 
conclusions. 
Wittgenstein was quite culturally pessimistic. And there are other 
things that he did have in common with conservatism, and I think 
rightly so. I think that there are things that conservatism has got 
right. Most crucially the resistance to theory in conservatism. The 
resistance to the idea you can have a grand plan for completely remod- 
elling society from the ground up. An idea which is fundamental to 
many forms of socialism and communism. An idea which is also 
found on the radical right in people like Hayek – Hayek in this way 
 
 
22 In Anthony Kenny & Brian McGuinness (eds), Wittgenstein and His 
Times (University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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is not a conservative as indeed explained in his famous essay, ‘Why I 
am not a Conservative’.23 
Insofar as conservatism resists the delusional ideology of progress, 
then Wittgenstein and I are for it. But I think it is wrong to think 
Wittgenstein is a conservative if by ‘conservative’ one means anything 
at all like what we have in this country that is called the Conservative 
Party. Because the Conservative Party in this country has basically 
nothing whatsoever to do with conservatism anymore. The 
Conservative Party is a fundamentally neoliberal party. It is commit- 
ted to endlessly more growth and ‘modernisation’, as well as to what it 
would claim as fiscal rectitude before all else. 
And also we should remember that Wittgenstein was profoundly 
attracted by socialism and by communism, at least as profoundly at- 
tracted to them as he was by conservatism – the same is true of me.24 
What we have to do, I believe, is try to find out, using something like 
the independent criterion that I sketched a little earlier, what is living 
and what is dead in the ideologies that we have inherited. Once we 
dispense with the delusional ideology of progressivism, of growth- 
ism, and once we dispense with developmentality,25 what is left? 
Well let’s quickly look then at the great ideologies that we have 
inherited and see how they fare on this score. So, take conservatism, 
represented today in this country by John Gray and Roger Scruton – 
although I would say that unfortunately both of those thinkers are 
still not conservative enough, in the sense that they’ve both been in- 
fected, in my view, to some considerable extent, by neoliberalism 
(They have, that is to say, too great a prejudice in favour of ‘the free 
market’). Conservatism, gets right, as I say, a fundamental resistance 
to theory, and a belief that there is something in our historical insti- 
tutions that is worth preserving – in institutions, for example, such as 
the common law, in community, and of course in advocacy of 
conservation. 
This is what I believe is living in conservatism. What is dead in 
conservatism, is its apologia for elites, its apologia for privilege, in 
particular its apologia for inherited privilege. None of these are 
tenable any more I think in our time today. A time which is  (or 
 
23 Found as a post-script to his The Constitution of Liberty (London: 
Routledge, 1960). 
24 For detail, see my ‘How ecologism is the true heir of both socialism 
and conservatism’: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/how-ecologism- is-
the-true-heir-of-both-socialism-and-conservatism/. 
25 On which, see Debal Deb, Beyond Developmentality (London: 
Earthscan, 2009). 
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rather: aspires to become), profoundly-rightly I believe, a democratic 
one. 
What about socialism? What is living in socialism? What I think is 
living in socialism is its fundamental idea of the social and of society, 
and tied in with that, the great dream, the great aspiration, the great 
goal: of equality, of human equality, as something to realise. (This 
connects directly with the importance of meaning democracy – 
thus, of democracy in the workplace – and with the placing centrally 
of the social, of society.) What is dead in socialism, as I already 
implied, is its ambition for a grand overarching plan that can recon- 
struct everything from the ground up. As was shown to disastrously 
fail, in the times when it was, to some extent, tried in Russia and other 
countries. 
And liberalism? What is living in liberalism is the idea of intellec- 
tual freedom, which is an idea profoundly important for Wittgenstein 
when he talked about the absolute importance of finding liberating 
words, of trying to liberate our minds from the ways in which they 
were held captive by inherited ideologies, which most of the time 
we are not even aware of. 
And what is living in liberalism also, is the importance of civil and 
political liberties. 
But what is dead in liberalism, and in its bastard child which is now 
ruling us, neoliberalism, is individualism, which has been a profound 
disaster for our world, a profound wrong direction that we’ve moved 
in. And in so far as individualism triumphs, then there will be no 
future for the human race. And this can be connected with 
Wittgenstein’s opposition to philosophical scepticism and to solip- 
sism I believe; I’ve written on this elsewhere.26 There is, in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and in the philosophy of some other 
great philosophers, some of whom I mentioned earlier, material for 
a profound resistance to the individualism which is a dominant and 
unquestioned ideology of our time. 
Something I like to do in my classes sometimes – I admit, it’s a 
little bit cruel – is to say to students, ‘What do you think is the 
most important thing about you?’ and very quickly someone will 
say, ‘It’s that I’m an individual’. And then often what will happen 
is that somebody else in the class will say ‘Yes, it’s the same for 
me!’ And then they’ll sometimes get swiftly to the point   where 
 
26 See Chapter 8, ‘Swastikas and Cyborgs: The Significance of PI 420’, 
of my AWittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 
2013), for a Reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations as a ‘war 
book’. 
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somebody will say ‘We are all above all individuals’, which some of 
you may recognise is a ‘quote’ (sic.) from a famous movie, The Life 
of Brian: ‘We are all individuals’. ‘So the thing about you that 
most quintessentially sums up who you are is that you are all indivi- 
duals?’, I ask; and they all shout, in unison, in earnest, ‘Yes!’ I’ve 
really done this, quite often, and it’s frightening how easy it is to do. 
This is a disastrous feature of our times. We have never been indi- 
viduals. We are mammals, we are quintessentially social animals, and 
linguistic animals. Moreover, we are in fact, of course, far more en- 
tangled than we’ve ever been before. Globalisation, thought 
through properly, ought to be the final death knell of the individual- 
istic fantasy that lies at the heart of liberalism. 
I suggest that we try to put aside what is dead in conservatism, in 
socialism, and liberalism, and bring together what is living in 
them. And bring together all of them under the banner of what’s 
been called in recent years ecologism. An ideology, a philosophy 
that takes as its fundamental starting point the truth that we now, 
even if we possibly didn’t have to before (though Tim Flannery 
and Jared Diamond would beg to differ), must take seriously that 
we are all completely beholden to our ecological conditions of possi- 
bility. That has to be the starting point and the ending point, the 
ground, for all of our political and philosophical thinking. 
Let me reciptulate. ‘You can’t stop progress’, we are constantly 
told. But what is meant by ‘progress’? What is progress toward? Is 
it progress toward human flourishing, as Aristotle would have it? Is 
it towards wisdom, as Socrates would want? Towards a culture, not 
just a civilisation? Wittgenstein says, ‘Our civilisation is characterised 
by the word progress.’ There is another famous aphorism where he 
says, ‘We have a civilisation; one day we may have a culture.’27 For 
Wittgenstein ‘civilisation’ wasn’t a very positive term, not as positive 
as in the famous quip of Gandhi’s on western civilisation. 
Wittgenstein believed that our having something that we could call 
honorifically a culture is something that we should aim attain; and 
we have not attained it yet. He thought this partly because of the 
extent to which he saw our society has been dominated by scientism. 
And was, very worryingly, becoming more dominated by it, not less. 
If progress was towards Aristotle’s goal, or Socrates’, or 
Wittgenstein’s, that would be great. That would be real. But that 
very rarely seems a criterion for how the word ‘progress’ is actually 
typically applied in our society today. 
 
 
27 Culture and value, 64 (my translation). 
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In fact, of course, one could have a more basic starting point. 
Before we even get to thinking about human flourishing, the flourish- 
ing of other beings, attaining wisdom, creating a culture out of our 
civilisation, it would be good to be at least reasonably confident that 
our civilisation was going to survive the next hundred years. But we 
cannot be confident of that. We can be less confident of that, the less 
we are prepared to give up on the ideologies of ‘progress’ and 
‘growth’. In our society, progress – and similarly growth – are taken 
for granted. They are the accepted ‘wisdom’ (sic.) of our media, our 
politics, our economics. We are suffering from the complete hegemon- 
ic taking-for-grantedness of the goal of economic growth – although 
we’re finally starting to see a few little chinks in it now,28 and I’m 
hoping to create another one here. 
‘Progress’ or ‘growth’ are simply a process that we are not allowed 
apparently to stop. Or that it would be futile to try to seek to stop, so 
that we are seemingly deliberately demoralised into giving up on even 
trying. We are prevented from thinking that we might even try. 
Questioning the myth of progress and concomitant myth of economic 
growth, and the basically synonymous myth of development is then a 
great task for intellectuals in our time. 
Let me just take a moment on ‘development’, for it’s such an 
unbelievably awful hubristic idea. What they tell us is that we live 
in a developed country and that there are all these other countries 
in the world that are ‘developing’. So what we’re supposed to 
believe is that all the other countries in the world are trying to, and 
ought to try to, aspire to be like us. As if we’ve arrived at the end of 
history and they are still in some kind of mini-dark age. 
Moreover, what this idea of us being developed occludes is the 
point that we are endlessly continuing to develop, i.e: creating more 
and more ‘development’ – building over more and more of the 
green belt, ripping things down, putting things up,29 with ever- 
increasing speed,30 everything allegedly getting better and more 
modern and so on all the time. In that sense, it is very obvious that 
 
28 To mention one example, it is worth looking at Bhutan’s goal: http:// 
www.grossnationalhappiness.com. 
29 The quotation that I have employed as an epigraph for the present 
essay includes this telling sentence: ‘Typically, it [our ‘progressive’ civiliza- 
tion] constructs’. For Wittgenstein, building was not to be equated with pro- 
gress. It might be (look say at the house he built); but often it was a substitute 
for thinking, for looking, for attending, for describing, for pausing, for 
dwelling. 
30 Think for instance of the untenable ‘life-cycle’ of mobile phones, 
today. 
281 
 Rupert Read 
 
we are, even on their own terms, a developing country.31 So we’re a 
developing country in that sense; but no, we’re apparently a devel- 
oped country. This is a profoundly dangerous self-contradictory 
ideology, an ideology which was created in its explicit form essential- 
ly by powerful Americans in the wake of the Second World War, in 
order to try to reinforce the system, which they were determined to 
remain at the heart of as decolonisation etc. happened.32 
Questioning the myth of progress and growth and development, 
and seeking to substitute for it the idea of real progress, progress 
which is actually assessed according to some independent, non- 
purely-procedural criterion, is a vital thing to do at this point in 
history. Literally life, or at least civilisation and the chance of 
culture in the future, may well depend on it. Sanity certainly 
depends on it. It is literally insane to seek to grow forever. 
Understanding this creates, as I have sought to make clear, some 
difficulties for the Left in politics because it brings into question 
the catch-all understand of leftism as ‘progressive’. It brings into 
question absolutely directly the ideology of ‘productivism’, which 
has historically been central to socialism: the dominant concept in 
socialism has typically been about making things, converting more 
and more of the earth into capital and into products for the masses. 
What I’ve been doing radically brings into question whether being 
‘progressive’, in this sense, is actually a good thing. 
Once we overcome the myth of progress, we can clear the ground 
for a real politics that would jettison the absurd hubris of liberalism, 
of individualism, and of much leftism. And would jettison the 
extreme Promethianism and lack of precaution endemic to our 
current pseudo-democratic technocracy. 
The challenge is to do so in a way that does not fall into complete 
pessimism. I am by no means seeking to foment despair or a cynical 
spectatorial stance: what I’m hoping to do is open up space in which 
we can actually think what the alternative might be to all of this. The 
challenge, as I say, is to do what I’ve just described in a way that does 
not fall into complete pessimism, nor into an endorsement of the 
untenable features of conservatism. Most crucially, its apologia for 
elites and hierarchies. 
The challenge, in other words, is to generate an ideology or phil- 
osophy for our time that might yet save us and ensure that we are 
 
31 I owe this point to Jonathan Essex: see his important essay on ‘How to 
Make-Do and Mend our economy’, in Blewitt and Cunningham (op.cit.). 
32 For detail on this, see Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development 
Dictionary (New York: Zed, 1992). 
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worth saving. That we don’t just have bare life, but rather flourishing, 
a culture, wisdom. This is what ecologism, seeking to integrate con- 
servatism, socialism and liberalism – what remains of those, what is 
not dead in them – and to put them on a sound foundation of one- 
planet living, might offer us. 
In conclusion, then. For Wittgenstein, ‘progress’ is not a feature of 
the main current of European/American civilization, but its form. 
That is to say: It is regarded as sufficient justification for any techno- 
logical or economic innovation, to say ‘That’s progress’. Or ‘You 
can’t stop progress.’ There is no possibility (or at least, has not 
been until very recently) endemic to the main cultural traditions of 
the West in recent centuries of questioning whether these changes 
really are progress. ‘Of COURSE’ they are. The only question is 
how they are to be best used. (Thus John Rawls for instance, the 
leading philosopher of contemporary liberalism, treats technology 
as a ‘standing resource’ for humanity, and treats the Earth the same 
way. There is no question of whether or not we might have funda- 
mentally the wrong attitude to these things.) 
For greens, the same is true as for Wittgenstein, on this point. That 
is to say: greens take issue with the mainstream, in that we ask, heret- 
ically, whether many of the changes that we have undergone or are 
undergoing are really progress. Is it really progress for instance to 
have built (as Wittgenstein figures it) an ever more complicated soci- 
etal and industrial structure? Perhaps globalisation, and longer and 
longer supply lines, are not progress. Is it really progress, in the ‘de- 
veloped’ world (a hubristic term that, as outlined above, needs in any 
case to be severely interrogated) to have more and more income and 
wealth, while happiness levels decline and the future itself is 
bankrupted? 
And so this lecture can be heard, and I hope you are able now to 
hear it, as a kind-of reading of what I’ve argued is Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s (most) crucial aphorism on this topic: 
‘Our civilisation (note not culture, ‘our civilisation’, what we actu- 
ally have, which is profoundly problematic) is characterised (and this 
is a central feature of that problematic) by the word progress; progress 
is its form, rather than making progress being one of its features.’ If 
we were to bring in an independent criterion to say what progress, real 
progress, actually was, a criterion that we cannot just take for granted, 
that doesn’t just go without saying and escape interrogation, then we 
would be changing from that situation. Progress then would poten- 
tially be a feature of our society, and this would be a good thing; 
whereas at the present time it is our society’s form, and this is a 
bad thing. 
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But we cannot take for granted, as I’ve sought to explain, that real 
progress will be or has been achieved. We are vulnerable creatures, 
profoundly vulnerable social beings,33 and our hubristic breaking 
of the limits to growth is making us more vulnerable every day. In 
this context, Wittgenstein’s wisdom on the unwisdom of the ideology 
of progress is philosophy that our time most profoundly needs. 
In the darkness of this time, Wittgensteinian thinking is a light that 
can give us direction. 
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33 This, again, conservatism gets right. 
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